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A REVIEW OF W. T. MOORE'S TRACT ON
"WOMAN'S WORK IN THE CHURCH,"
AND A SUPPLEMENT, REVIEWING T. A. KERLEY
ON "WOMAN'S PLACE IN THE CHURCH."
BY G. G. TAYLOR.
NASHVILLE, TENN.: GOSPEL ADVOCATE
PUBLISHING COMPANY. 1896.
-3-
In the interests of primitive Christianity I have been
requested to examine a tract written by W.T. Moore on the subject
of "Woman's Work in the Church." There is a
considerable portion of this tract, especially the last seven
pages, barring a few Ashdodic expressions, which in my humble
judgment deserves the highest commendation. What the author says
about woman "in the family," "in the Sunday
school," "in society," and in other private
relations in life, can scarcely be improved, either in matter or
form. It is all so truthfully and beautifully said that, in
coming to it after groping with the author through the first
fifteen pages of illogical deductions and misapplication of
scripture, the reader experiences similar delightful sensations
which one feels when emerging from some dark and dank cavern into
the radiant and glowing sunlight of a summer day. It would have
been vastly more creditable to the author's head, and doubtless
much more to the interests of truth, if the main body of this
tract had been suppressed and only the supplementary conclusion
had been permitted to see the light of day.
-4-
This having been presented last and that first in the tract is
one among other indications of the extraordinary ingenuity with
which the author has presented his ease. He proves himself to be
a master in the art in shielding the weakness of his main
question, which alone is in controversy, by inviting to, and
absorbing attention upon, the strength and beauty of questions
which are only collateral, and on which all are agreed. It was
shrewd in the author to relieve the bitterness of the main dose
by the sweetness of an aftertaste. While loyalty to truth, for
which we stand, calls forth admiration and cordial commendation
of the last part of this tract, that same loyalty to truth in
cites irreconcilable hostility to the principal and leading part.
We now invite attention to its scriptural and logical mistakes.
The author does not state the issue on this subject accurately
when he says (referring to 1 Cor. 14: 34): " This has been
considered by many as conclusive against woman's right to
participate in the public worship." So far as I have ever
heard of, no one has ever claimed that this passage or any other
forbids woman " participating in the public worship."
It is not the fact of participation in public worship, but the
manner of such participation upon the part of woman, that is in
question. The issue does not involve woman as a worshiper, but
woman as a leader of the public worship of the church. It does
not involve woman as a speaker, not even woman as a speaker in
the public worship of the church. It does involve such speaking,
or speaking in such a way, as places woman above man in
authority, thus antagonizing the divine order of headship for
man.
-5-
Besides this, the true issue involves such speaking, speaking
in such a way, as places woman individually and personally
conspicuous before the public, thus subjecting her to "
shame " and " dishonor." This is done whenever she
as the only speaker on any occasion addresses a public audience.
When, therefore, we refer to woman as making public speeches, we
wish to be understood as meaning the kind of speaking here
described. We are thus careful in correcting this misconception
and consequent misstatement of the issue, be cause by so doing
the irrelevancy of such points raised by the author as the
following will at once be seen: " Now, if it be denied that
woman has the right to speak and pray, then by what authority is
she admitted to the privilege of singing in the congregation ?
"Now, since no one denies woman the right to speak and pray,
therefore no one on this account encounters any difficulty in
finding authority by which she is " admitted to the
privilege of singing in the congregation." But if as a
singer in the public worship of the church she should assume a
position of authority over n]an, or if she should in singing in
the public worship make herself conspicuously prominent before
the public, thus subjecting herself to prejudicial remark and
criticism, then her singing would fall under the same
condemnation which Paul pronounces on her speech in 1 Cor. 14:
34.
-6-
Near the close of his argument the writer makes the following
distinction: "Another important distinction which is most
generally overlooked needs to be stated with emphasis at this
point of our investigation. I refer to the obvious difference
which the Scriptures make between preaching the gospel to the
world and teaching the 'all things' which are necessary to the
development of spiritual life in the church. I think that men
only were commissioned to do the first, while men and women alike
have the privilege of doing the second." Now it is very true
that the Scriptures make a distinction between " preaching
the gospel to the world " and " teaching the ' all
things ' which are necessary to the development of spiritual life
in the church," but let it be distinctly noted that the
Scriptures do not make a distinction between the persons
commissioned to do the first and the persons privileged to do the
second; and since it is this last distinction which the author's
cause needs, and not the first, it follows that he finds nothing
whatever in the way of scriptural distinction to aid him in
maintaining his cause. On the contrary, in the very passage in
which men are commissioned to " preach the gospel to the
world " the same men are also commissioned to " teach
the ' all things ' necessary to the development of spiritual life
in the church." Note the following: "Go ye therefore,
and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father,
and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe
all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with
you always, even unto the end of the world." -- Matt. 28:19.
If the fact of men being commissioned to preach the gospel to the
world excludes women from the privilege of doing this work, then
since the same
-7-
commission authorizes the same men to teach the " all
things " to the church, women are equally excluded from the
privilege of doing this last work also. So it appears that the
only distinction which is pertinent to the case, and the one in
reality on which the point made by the author should have been
based, is not only not found in the word of God, but is in
positive antagonism to what is written therein. In the absence of
any scriptural distinction favoring the point which the author of
the tract endeavors to make, he seeks to make out his case on his
own judgment, as follows: "One work (preaching the gospel to
the world) is in many respects unsuitable to woman's peculiar
organization and habits. The other (teaching the " all
things," etc.) furnishes her a field of labor where she can
bring into active exercise all her noblest powers. I would not,
there fore, have woman enter into the work of preaching the
gospel to the world, except as she may do so incidentally in her
private ministrations. The public proclamation of the gospel is
an intensely aggressive work. It is a ' wrestle with
principalities and powers,' with ' spiritual wickedness in high
places.' In a word, it involves a direct issue between Christ and
Satan for the conquest of the world, and precipitates a conflict
entirely too rugged for woman to engage in. Her mission is rather
the spiritual development of those who have been gained from the
world to Christ. Hence we would not allow her to preach the
gospel in the ordinary acceptation of that phrase."
-8-
But, forsooth, suppose some good sister's judgment should
differ from the author's on her fitness for this " intensely
aggressive work: " then what? there are thousands of women,
who, like ourself, think the author's judgment, like any other
man's judgment, is of very little value in religious matters; and
should they feel at liberty to assume the grave responsibilities
of preaching the gospel to the world on such authority as the
judgment of this author, then, in our judgment, such fact would
be ample proof that she lacks other and even more important
qualifications than can be found in her "peculiar
organization and habits" as a woman. But again. The writer,
referring to his consistency in advocating the privilege of woman
speaking publicly in church, while at the same time claiming that
she is specially forbidden to exercise " extraordinary
spiritual gifts " in the church, says: " I do not now
stop to inquire why woman was allowed to speak in one of these
instances referred to, and not in the other. It would be easy to
show, I think, that there is profound wisdom in all this; but I
can not enter upon the discussion now, as it is sufficient for us
to know what the facts are without seeking to account for them.''
Now, since the only evidence which the writer gives by which we
may know V -)ill en were allowed to speak in one of these
instance s exists in an equal degree to show us that she was al
lowed to speak in the other instance also, we cannot know, with
that evidence before us, that it was a fact that she was allowed
to speak in one instance with out knowing by the same evidence
that it was a fact that she was allowed to speak in the other
instance also. "But the author admits that we know by divine
prohibition that she was not allowed to speak
-9-
in one of these instances, from which we necessarily conclude
that her "peculiar organization and habits " are not
sufficient evidence on which we may know that women were allowed
to speak in the other of these instances. But again. When the
writer of the tract was looking for some scriptural authority for
women to make public speeches in the church, he thought he had
found it in the following way: Joel, as interpreted by Peter On
Pentecost, declared that women should "prophesy " under
the reign of Christ.- Acts 2. And Paul defines "
prophesying" to be "speaking to edification, to
exhortation, and to comfort." 1 Cor. 14:3. Now upon this
evidence exclusively he announces this conclusion: "All this
clearly shows . . . that in the public assembly she spoke to
edification, to exhortation, and to comfort." But did it
never occur to the mind of the writer that " preaching the
gospel to the world " is " speaking to edification, to
exhortation, and to comfort? " It is quite certain that
these three elements, in a very large measure, entered into the
apostolic ministry. Peter on the day of Pentecost inaugurated
this work of preaching the gospel to the world by " lifting
up his voice " and edifying the people, and " with many
other words did he testify and exhort; " and when they had
"gladly received the word," they " continued daily
with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to
house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart,
praising God and having favor with all the people." This, it
strikes me, was no little comfort. I would not miss it far if I
should say that all the preaching done in this age, both to the
world and to the church, was " speaking to edification, to
exhortation, and to comfort."
-10-
Now then, if "prophesying" in the sense of
"speaking to edification, exhortation, and
comfort,""clearly shows that in the church assembly she
spoke to edification, to exhortation, and comfort," then why
does not the same "prophesying" just as clearly show
that to the world she spoke to edification, to exhortation, and
to comfort? This distinction of the author's--not the
Bible's--thus proves to be a distinction without a difference;
and its author, by inventing it, along with so many others of a
similar character, has very justly earned for himself the
distinction of being not only a man of distinction, but of being
a man of distinctions. In nine cases out of every ten a man, when
endeavoring to reason on the wrong side of a question, will hang
himself at the end of his own logical rope. If the author's
distinction is right, then his reasoning is wrong; and if his
reasoning is right, then his distinction is wrong. If we are to
accept the author's distinction between persons commissioned to
preach the gospel to the world and persons privileged to
"teach the 'all things' necessary for the development of
spiritual life in the church," then beyond all hope of
reclamation the first five pages of his logic go down. But we are
not willing to stand by and see a man commit logical suicide with
such a clumsy weapon as we have shown this arbitrary and
unauthorized distinction to be. Having wrested it from his hand,
we here cast it aside as worthless, and thus allow his
argument--such as it is--to survive for a little while only the
fate of his distinction.
-11-
ARGUMENT I. We now invite attention to the author's arguments
in support of woman's privilege to make public speeches in
church. According to Joel and Peter, women were to "
prophesy " under the reign of Christ; and, according to
Paul, " prophesying " is " speaking to
edification, exhortation, and comfort." From these facts the
author draws the following conclusion: "All this clearly
shows . . . that in the public assembly she spoke to edification,
to exhortation, and to comfort." I will point out the
defects of this reasoning numerically. 1. We quote the following
from the tract: "The gift of prophecy was a supernatural
endowment and conferred the power to foretell events. Women were
not allowed to exercise this extraordinary gift in the public
assembly of the saints. There was, however, a more general use of
the word 'prophecy,' as in 1 Cor. 11: 5, which properly describes
such speakings in the ordinary meetings of the church as was
intended for mutual encouragement and comfort. In this exercise I
think woman participated, and should not be denied the same
privilege now." It will be seen from the above quotation
that the writer makes a distinction between prophesying as a
"supernatural endowment" and prophesying in the
"more general sense" of speaking in the ordinary
meetings of the church for mutual encouragement and comfort. In
this last kind of prophesying only he claims that women should be
allowed to participate.
-12-
Before we call attention to the argument we wish it noted that
the distinction between prophecy as a " miraculous gift
" and prophecy in the sense of "speaking to
edification, exhortation, and comfort," is not a scriptural
distinction at all. On the contrary, prophecy as a "
miraculous gift " is the only kind of prophecy we read about
in the word of God, and its exercise always had in view the
edification, encouragement, and comfort of those who were
addressed by it. Since, however, this author claims the word is
used in two senses different from each other, how do we know but
that in the passages referred to it is the "miraculous gift
of prophecy" or the "supernatural endowment "
which the author admits women were not allowed to exercise in the
public assemblies of the saints? Now, before the statements in
Joel's prophecy and Peter's speech on Pentecost could have been
properly used in his argument, the author should have shown
clearly that the prophesying mentioned in those passages is the
kind which he claims women may do in the public assemblies. This
he should have shown to be not only a probable or a possible
fact, but an absolute and unquestionable certainty, before the
argument is complete to prove anything at all. But this very
necessary and indispensable work on his algument is utterly
wanting, and on this account it is left empty and vain. 2. The
argument founded on these passages as presented by the author not
only fails to prove what is intended to be established by it, but
when properly presented proves precisely the opposite. The
prophesying which Joel and Peter here ascribe to woman in these
passages of scripture, as a matter of fact, is not only not the
kind of prophesying
-13-
which is claimed woman may do in the public assembly, but, on
the contrary, is the kind which he claims she is forbidden to do
in such assemblies. viz., "supernatural endowment" or
the "miraculous gift of prophecy." This is evident from
the fact that both the inspired prophet and the inspired apostle
class and associate this prophesying with other supernatural
endowments, and with no other kind of endowments. It, with other
things, is referred to as accounting for the extraordinary and
astounding phenomena of the occasion. A mention or specification
of the simple fact that men and women were to speak would
scarcely account for the marvelous and miraculous occurrences
which had occasioned such amazement among the people; but the
exercise of a " miraculous gift " or of a " super
natural endowment " upon the part of both men and women
would not only accord with the prophecy in Joel, but agree with
its declared fulfillment on Pentecost. Since, therefore, the kind
of prophesying mentioned in these passages is the kind which the
author says woman was forbidden to exercise in the public
assembly, it follows that when it is used by him to establish her
privilege to prophesy in the public assemblies of the saints it
is a misapplication of the holy Scriptures. 3. But again. It is a
rule in logic that nothing must be embodied in the conclusion of
an argument which is not contained in its premises. Now the
conclusion in the argument under consideration contains "
public assemblies of the saints." In deed, this element,
being the only thing in it in dispute, is on that account the
only essential thing in it which it should continue.
-14-
All agree that women may prophesy and speak; and the
controversy is not concerning the fact of these exercises, but it
is about the places where and the ways in which women may engage
in them. Now, the public "assemblies of the saints" is
in the author's conclusion, and it can be there properly and
legitimately only by being also in his premises; but,
unfortunately for his reputation as a logician, it is totally and
conspicuously absent from those premises. All of female agency,
whether in the way of duty or privilege, embraced in Joel's
prophecy, Peter's speech on Pentecost, or Paul's discussion in 1
Cor. 14, might be done in private circles without any public
assembly in the case. Since, therefore, the only essential
element in the conclusion of his argument is not found in its
premises, it is an illogical inter-loper, and must be retired
from that conclusion; or, in other words, since there is not one
thing said or implied in either of these scriptures concerning,
"public assemblies of the saints," this argument in the
tract fails to prove that woman is authorized in these passages
to speak in the public assemblies of the saints. And this being
true a fortiori, the argument thus defective fails to establish
her right or privilege to indulge in that specific kind or manner
of speaking in the public assemblies which places her in
authority over man or subjects her to the dishonor and disgrace
elsewhere referred to by the apostle in connection with her
" silence " in the church. There are other objections
to this effort at reasoning which might be filed, but we feel
that to mention them would be a work of supererogation.
-15-
What has already been said is amply sufficient, we judge, to
satisfy the reader of the desperation of that cause which depends
for its life upon such rickety argumentation as this. The most
astonishing thing about it is that an intelligent man would offer
it at all, and especially in the face of some of the plainest
statements in the word of God, which unequivocally prove directly
the opposite to be true. ARGUMENT II. The second effort to prove
that women are authorized to make public speeches in church is
founded on the eleventh chapter of First Corinthians. He
introduces this argument by saying: "By a careful
examination of the first part of the eleventh chapter of First
Corinthians it will be abundantly evident that women did both
pray and prophesy in public." After quoting from the fourth
to the nineteenth verse, instead of proceeding to give us some of
the abundant evidence referred to, he proceeds to make some
observations on a "contention concerning wearing the
hair" which he suppose existed in the church at Corinth,
which, as a matter of fact, had no existence at all, as we shall
see further on; and which, if it had existed, had no bearing
whatever on the question he was discussing. Now, after discussing
this imaginary capillary "contention" at some length,
he, seemingly conscious of the little which could be said in the
way of independent argumentation on the question of his tract,
shifts ground by placing some imaginary opponent in the
affirmative, and then throws himself on the defensive in the
following tragic style: "Now I am aware that the
'prophesying' and 'praying' here spoken of are by many supposed
to have been done in private,
-16-
and hence cannot license woman to exhort and pray in the
public congregation. But this, I think, is a clear
misinterpretation of the meaning of the scripture. Why should it
have been necessary to say that every woman 'praying and
prophesying with her head uncovered dishonoreth her head,' if
these exercises were done in private? If she was to be seen by no
one, how could her action be a public offense?" 1. First of
all, let it be noted that all which was said in reply to his
first argument applies with equal force in reply to this. 2. If
there was any "public offense" referred to in this part
of the Scriptures, the author has failed to point it out; and if
we are to learn that this 'praying and prophesying" was done
in a public assembly by the fact of a "public offense"
having been given, then, this being absent, that also vanishes
out of sight with it. 3. The author-innocently, we hope-imposes
on his readers a literary fraud by adding the seventeenth and
eighteenth verses to his quotation from the eleventh chapter of
First Corinthians. The headdress question begins with the fourth
verse, and closes with the sixteenth, and then a new question
entirely is introduced with the seventeenth verse, which is
discussed to the end of the chapter. Now, by quoting the
seventeenth and eighteenth verses in connection with the previous
part of the chapter, he makes the impression that Paul associates
the "praying and prophesying" referred to in this
previous part of the chapter with the " coming together
" referred to in these verses; whereas the "coming
together" referred to in these verses is
-17-
associated by the apostle with the communion question
introduced in the seventeenth verse and concluded with the end of
the chapter; and the "contention" to which the author
alludes as existing in the church at Corinth was about this
communion question, and not at all about the long and short hair
business, as he alleges. Neither in this passage nor in any other
place where women are referred to as speakers with approval is
there any indication that such speaking was done when the
disciples were " come together " like a church
assembly. 4. But the author says: " That the apostle has
before his mind the public assembly of the disciples, is still
further evident from the twentieth verse of the chapter we have
been considering. In this he calls the attention of the
Corinthian brethren to another error into which they had
fallen-viz., an improper use of the Lord's Supper. He declares
that when they came together in the church it was not to eat the
Lord's Supper, but rather to make a supper for themselves, all of
which shows that he is speaking of practices in the public
worship of the saints; and hence the prophesying and praying of
women referred to were not in private, but in public." And
in the same way precisely I might add: "And hence the
'idolatry,' and the 'fornication,' and the 'tempting Christ,' and
the 'murmuring,' etc., of the preceding chapter, were not in
private, but in public." Such reasoning as this is too
absurd for serious consideration. 5. But, with a confidence which
indicates that the author thinks the matter is settled by the
question, he asks: "Why should it have been necessary to
-18-
say that every woman praying and prophesying with her head
uncovered dishonoreth her head, if these exercises were done in
private?" When the author thus puts this question he must of
necessity mean that nothing but the circumstance of a public
assembly can meet the exigencies of the case; for if there can be
any other reasons for covered heads for women when praying and
prophesying than the circumstance of a public assembly, the
question loses the only point it contains, and be comes a
lifeless corpse in its author's hands. Now, had he given himself
the trouble to look, he would have discovered that the apostle
gives two separate and distinct reasons for women covering their
heads while engaged in these exercises, neither one of which
implies a public assembly in the case. One of these reasons is
expressed in the following language: " For this cause ought
the woman to have power on her head because of the angels."
(Verse l().) No matter whether the word " angels " here
means celestial or terrestrial messengers; in either case, it
does not involve the idea of a public assembly, which is the sine
qua non for covered heads for women in praying and prophesying in
the author's argument. So that this one reason of the apostle, if
there was nothing more, robs the author's interrogation argument
of all the point there is in it. But the apostle gives another
reason for covered heads for women in these exercises in the
following language: "Every woman that prayeth or prophesieth
with her head uncovered dishonoreth her head." The author of
the tract assumes without any warrant whatever that these
exercises thus performed
-19-
could not involve the dishonor mentioned except done in a
public assembly. Inasmuch as this assumption embodying the
premises of his argument is absolutely destitute of any support,
no one can intelligently accept his conclusion. That no such an
idea as this was in the apostle's mind is evident from the
explanation which he immediately gives for his statement. Note
his language: " For that is even all one as if she were
shaven. For if the woman be not covered, let her also be shorn:
but if it be a shame for a woman to be shorn or shaven, let her
be covered." Now, if the idea of a public assembly is not in
the matter of long hair for women to avert the shame here
referred to, so neither is the idea of a public assembly in the
matter of veiled heads for women to escape the dishonor referred
to in the passage. No one has yet ever contended, and I presume
no one ever will, that Paul here teaches shaven or shorn heads
for women are shameful only in a public assembly; so neither
ought any one ever to con tend that uncovered heads for women in
praying and prophesying is shameful only in a public assembly.
Paul here declares that one of these things is just
"even" with the other. But again. This argument of the
apostle includes the habit of men while praying and prophesying,
as well as the habit of women. Note: " Every man praying or
prophesying having his head covered dishonoreth his head."
Now could the author of this pamphlet find in the circumstance of
a public assembly the only possible reason for Paul's instruction
for uncovered heads for men when they pray or prophesy? I wonder,
indeed, if he would
-20-
venture to put the case thus interrogatively: "Why should
it have been necessary to say that 'every man praying or
prophesying with his head covered dishonoreth his head,' if these
exercises were done in private?" Certainly the distinction
of publicity or privacy is not in the apostle's reference to
shorn or unshorn hair for men and women in this passage of
scripture; and equally certain is it that there is no reference
to a public assembly in the apostle's discourse on the matter of
covered and uncovered heads for men and women when praying and
prophesying. Having shown that this reason assigned by the author
of the tract for the necessity of saying, "Every woman
praying and prophesying with her head uncovered dishonoreth her
head," is a figment of the author's imagination, we will now
briefly invite attention to the meaning of Paul's reason for
women to veil their heads when praying and prophesying, viz., by
failing to do so she dishonoreth her head. The place to be filled
and the work to be done by the sexes has always been recognized
with marked distinctness. This distinction originated in their
creation, and their Creator by divine regulation has ever kept it
clearly before their minds. Among other ways by which this has
been done is the regulation in dress or costume. Moses gave
specific mention of it in the following language: "The woman
shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a
man put on a woman's garment: for all that do so are abomination
unto the Lord thy God."--Deut. 22:5.
-21-
So deeply has the principle been fastened upon the convictions
of mankind that it has been universally observed in all ages and
among all nations. In the New Testament Scriptures by both Paul
and Peter directions of a specific character are given; and Paul
in this passage refers to it as a custom the propriety of which
"nature itself," outside of revelation, gives
intelligible light. In this passage of scripture, therefore, the
apostle teaches that in the exercise of her religious duties
woman must not lay aside the symbols of her sex; that should she
do so the act would be accompanied with the same dishonor which
would attend a disregard of her appropriate garb or costume in
the ordinary walks of life. Such is the plain meaning of this
much abused and strangely misapplied passage of the holy
Scriptures. We would suggest at this point that from Moses to
Paul inspiration has had no use for the "new woman" is
society at large, nor place for her in the worship or work of the
church of God. With his argument based on Paul's language
concerning women praying and prophesying with veiled heads, the
author closes his defense of women making public speeches in the
church. He then seeks some way to reconcile his position on this
subject with Paul's prohibition of women speaking in church,
recorded in 1 Cor. 14:34, 35, which reads as follows: "Let
your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted
unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience,
as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them
as their husbands at home; for it is a shame for women to speak
in the church."
-22-
Referring to his interpretation of the eleventh chapter, he
says: "Now if this view of the matter be correct, then
Paul's prohibition in the fourteenth chapter must have some
special reference, and can not refer to the public worship as it
is ordinarily conducted." Now, inasmuch as the author claims
that Paul's prohibition must have some special reference solely
on the ground that his view of the other matter is correct, since
his view of the other matter has been shown to be incorrect, then
any special reference for Paul's prohibition is effectually cut
off; and, so far as it is affected by his reasoning, it remains
with all the force of a general reference, covering not only
prophecy as the exercise of " supernatural endowment,"
but also prophecy in the sense of " speaking to edification,
exhortation, and comfort " as well. In looking around to
find some special reference for the prohibition of Paul, he
thinks he finds it in the "extraordinary spiritual
gifts" which are discussed in this connection. I quote from
the tract as follows: "The sum of all this is that the
apostle has under consideration the extraordinary spiritual gifts
conferred upon the first Christians. In the twelfth chapter he
shows what wonderful endowments these gifts confer; but, as if to
check the pride of those who might be puffed up, he devotes the
thirteenth chapter to showing that all these spiritual gifts will
amount to nothing if those who are endowed with them have not
charity. The fourteenth chapter is then used as a practical
illustration as to the working of these extraordinary gifts in
the public meetings of the congregations. Hence, I think it is
sufficiently clear that the exercises spoken of in the fourteenth
chapter are exhibitions of miraculous gifts, and cannot be
predicated of the ordinary public service of the church. During
these exercises the women were to keep silence."
-23-
The author is clearly right when he claims that the apostle is
speaking of prophecy as a "supernatural endowment," or
all "extraordinary spiritual gift," throughout this
entire context; but he is just as clearly wrong when he on this
account limits the prohibition of the thirty-fourth and
thirty-fifth verses to such "supernatural endowment."
We might as well contend that the duty of repentance should be
limited to the specific examples of it mentioned in Luke 3:10-14,
where the lesson of repentance is taught. The holy Scriptures is
a book of principles, and the principle embodied in one specified
case may apply in many other cases which may not be specifically
mentioned. If the principle concerning the prohibition of the
speaking mentioned in this particular context will apply in the
same way to other kinds of speaking not mentioned in the con
text, then it follows that the prohibition of this passage may
not on this account be limited to the speaking found in this
context. In such a case the prohibition will cover the last
mentioned speaking, as well as the former. Now the principle
underlying the prohibition is to be found in the reasons given by
the apostle for the silence here enjoined on women in the
churches. The reader will see at once that the author, in order
to make 011t his case, was under the logical necessity of showing
that "supernatural endowment " was the reason given for
that silence. This indispensable logistic necessity has not only
not been met by the author, but, on the contrary, it has been
utterly repudiated by him in the following statement:
-24-
"I do not now stop to inquire why woman was allowed to
speak in one of these instances (ordinary speaking in the
church), and not in the other (inspired speaking). It would be
easy to show, I think, that there is profound wisdom in all this;
but I cannot enter upon the discussion now, as it is sufficient
for us to know what the facts are, without seeking to account for
them." Easy as the task above referred to may have appeared
to the author, it was nevertheless much easier, it seems, for him
to let it severely alone. Had his view been divested of the
enchantment which distance gave it, he would no doubt have
discovered that both the "facts" and the reasons for
them alike have no existence in reality. It occurs to me that it
would require a very high order of intelligence indeed to show
why an uninspired woman may "speak to edification,
exhortation, and comfort" in the churches, and yet be
positively forbidden to do so if she is inspired-i. e.. that the
holy Scriptures authorize a woman to edify, exhort, and comfort
the churches of Christ when she is imperfectly qualified, and
consequently liable to make serious and even fatal mistakes; but
that this same woman is positively forbidden by the holy
Scriptures to do this work when she is thoroughly and perfectly
qualified to do it without the possibility of mistake or
disaster. It may require but a small effort upon the part of a
man of the author's mental capability to show that a thing
evidently so absurd is nevertheless true, but I am candid to
confess that such an accomplishment is far beyond the reach of an
ordinary mortal like myself. By leaving this matter in such all
unsatisfactory shape, the distinguished author of this tract has
seriously injured his reputation as a logician.
-25-
But this is not all, not even the worst of it. The simple fact
that it occurred to his mind to refer to this matter at all
indicates that the prohibition of inspired speaking very
naturally carries along with it by implication the prohibition of
ordinary uninspired speaking also. We now propose to show that
the author breaks down his own argument by rejecting the
"distinction" on which it rests. Let it be remembered
that the author claims that the word "prophesy" is used
sometimes in the sense of a "miraculous gift," in which
sense women are forbidden to exercise it in the churches; but at
other times it is used in the sense "speaking to
edification, exhortation, and comfort," in which sense women
are at liberty to exercise it in the churches. Now, it has
scarcely escaped the attention of the reader that the author gets
this last meaning of the word "prophesy" from the third
verse of the fourteenth chapter of First Corinthians, even
quoting for his definition the exact language of the text. Now,
if it is shown that the "prophesying" of the this text
is among the "extraordinary spiritual gifts" to which
he claims Paul's prohibition has special reference, then it
follows that Paul's prohibition specially prohibits the only kind
of prophesying which the author claims women may exercise in the
church. Beginning with the first verse, we quote: "Follow
after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may
prophesy. For he that speaketh in an unknown tongue speaketh not
unto men, but unto God; for no man understandeth him. . .
-26-
But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men to edification, and
exhortation, and comfort.?" Paul here teaches the
Corinthians to desire spiritual gifts, but more especially the
gift of prophesying as the most desirable of all Prophecy is not
here contrasted with spiritual gifts, but as one desirable
spiritual gift it is contrasted with another, which is less
desirable, viz., speaking with tongues. Again, verse five: "
I would that ye all spake with tongues, but rather that ye
prophesied: for greater is he that prophesieth than he that
speaketh with tongues." The speaking here mentioned is of
two kinds, viz., speaking with tongues and prophesying; and of
these two, Paul prefers that they shall exercise the latter
rather than the former, and gives, as a good reason for this
preference, because it exalts its possessor in greatness. Again,
we quote verse twelve: "Even so ye, forasmuch as ye are
zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the
edifying of the church "-i. e., among those spiritual gifts
seek prophesying, which is the kind of " speaking to
edification," etc. And again, verses eighteen and nineteen:
"I thank my God, I speak with tongues more than ye all: yet
in the church I had rather speak five words with my
understanding, that by my voice I might teach others also, than
ten thousand words in an unknown tongue." Thus Paul
continues the discourse by way of keeping up the contrast until
he brings it into the church itself as a proper place for this
kind of speaking. And now, still more to the point under
consideration, verses twenty - three and twenty four:
-27-
"If therefore the whole church be come together into one
place, and all speak with tongues and there come in those that
are unlearned or unbelievers, will they not say that ye are mad?
But if all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or
one unlearned, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all,"
etc. Without a shadow of a doubt Paul here clearly teaches that
while both of these kinds of speaking are permissible in the
church, yet prophesying is far preferable, because by it the
"unlearned and unbelievers are convinced." Once more,
we quote verses thirty-one to thirty three: " For ye may all
prophesy one by one, that all may learn, and all may be
comforted. And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the
prophets. For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace,
as in all churches of the saints." And then follows Paul's
prohibition: "Let your women keep silence in the churches:
for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are
commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if
they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home:
for it is a shame for women to speak in the church." So that
this same prophesying by which all may "learn and all may be
comforted," as the most preferable kind of speaking to be
done in the churches, is the prophesying of Paul's discourse from
the beginning, where he defines it "speaking to edification,
exhortation, and comfort," down to the very verse in which
his prohibition of women speaking in the church appears.
-28-
It thus becomes clearly manifest that the author of this
pamphlet, when he claims that the prophesying of this chapter is
that which is specifically forbidden to women, while at the same
time maintaining the prophesying of this chapter to be the kind
which women are at liberty to exercise in the churches, crosses
his own tract, breaks down his own "distinction," ruins
his own argument, and thus sets aside his own interpretation of
the passage. This species of logical suicide is a fine example of
the circus feat of riding a horse in two different and opposite
directions at the same time. As a matter of fact, speech, as
modified or unmodified by inspiration, is not given by the
apostle among the reasons for the prohibition at all. On the
contrary, those reasons, as given, have no reference in any way
to the circumstance of "supernatural endowment;" and
they exist in full force, whether the speech is inspired or
uninspired, thus excluding "extraordinary spiritual
gifts," as such, from any essential connection with the
case. Had the apostle intended to teach that women are prohibited
the exercise of "supernatural endowment " exclusively,
he certainly was singularly unfortunate in his method of so
teaching. The reader has doubtless observed that the word
"prophesy" is left entirely out of the passage in
question, and the more general term "speak" is
inserted. If the apostle had here intended to interdict inspired
teaching exclusively, why should he discard the word
"prophesy," which the author acknowledges is used in
this immediate connection in the sense of a "miraculous
gift," which would have definitely expressed that idea, and,
instead, adopt the word "speak," which, to say the
least of it, leaves the matter vague and indefinitely expressed?
-29-
Be this as it may, so far as the argument in the tract is
concerned it matters nothing whether the speech here prohibited
to women is the exercise of an "extraordinary spiritual
gift" or not. It is, nevertheless, that
"prophesying" which Paul in the context detines to be
"speaking to edification, exhortation and comfort; "
and this is the kind of prophesying which the author claims women
are at liberty to exercise in the church. So that in either case
Paul stands in irreconcilable hostility to W. T. Moore on "
Woman's Work in the Church." We close this review impressed
more and more with the "depths of both the wisdom and
knowledge of God." The words of inspiration have been so
wisely chosen that their meaning will stand out bold and clear,
not only against the assaults of malignant foes, but against the
more formidable dangers arising from the unfortunate
misconceptions of shrewd and ingenious friends. SUPPLEMENT. A
Review of T. A. Kerley on "Woman's Place in the
Church." There have been many and varied efforts made to
give the prohibitory language of this text (1 Cor. 14: 34, 35)
some "special application;" not that such
interpretation is demanded by the passage itself, but that a pet
theory might in some way be saved from a condemnation which the
plain and incontrovertible meaning of the passage evidently
imposes upon it.
-30-
With these exegetes it seems that the question is not what the
passage means, so that they may harmonize their practice with its
teachings, but what can the passage be made to mean, so that its
teaching shall harmonize with their practice. The last of these
efforts which has come under our notice was published in a recent
number of the Tennessee Methodist, and written by T.A. Kerley, a
Methodist preacher stationed at Grallatin, Tenn. It has been
suggested that to clear the field down to date we give this
article some attention. On account of the circumscribed limits
within which we must confine our notice of this article, we can
give attention only to its most important features. The author
begins by giving his theory of investigation in the following
language: "The subject will have to be investigated in
accord with modern movements and conclusions reached in harmony
with the teachings of the Bible and the developments of
Providence." In another place he says: "A woman may do
all the work of the Christian ministry as legitimately as a man
may do it, if Providence opens the way, and God makes the call,
and the church recognizes the movement." These statements
clearly mean that a woman may not answer a call simply because
God makes it, but that such a call must be supplemented by what
he calls a "providential development," and harmonize
with " modern movements." If the author means what this
language signifies-viz., "modern movements" and the
"developments of Providence" as distinct from the
Bible, together with the Bible, must all be recognized as
authoritative standards in the determination of what shall enter
into the practical duties of human life-then he represents
himself fully " abreast of the age " of folly, a
full-fledged, " progressive
-31-
"malcontent, in full sympathy with the "higher
criticism" nonsense, and should at once join Mrs. Cady
Stanton and her infidel sisterhood in their project of making a
new Bible. But if by "modern movements" and the
"developments of Providence" the author simply means
the circumstantial or accidental facilities making it possible
for woman, as the sole speaker on any occasion or under any
circumstances, to make public speeches in the churches, then our
reply to this, as well as to the other case, is that such
"modern movements" and "providential
developments" have nothing whatever to do with the question
in controversy. The question is not "woman's place in the
church" at any particular place or time, or under any
particular circumstances, but woman's right to make individual
public speeches in the churches at all. This question must be
settled by the word of God alone, independent of all "modern
movements" and "providential developments," no
matter what the meaning of these expressions as used by the
writer may be. His first effort to settle this question by the
Scriptures is based on the meaning of the word "
prophesy." Women, according to the Scriptures, are to "
prophesy," and the meaning of this word, according to the
authorities quoted, is: "Foretelling something to come,
preaching, public interpretation of Scripture" (Webster);
"The exercise of the office of inspired teaching in the
church, preaching" (Worcester); etc. Now, because the word
is thus defined, he thinks woman is authorized to "publicly
interpret the Scriptures," to "teach publicly in the
church," etc. It would be absurd to claim that this word, or
any
-32-
other word for that matter, has in every instance of its use
all the meanings which the lexicons give to it. The writer whose
article we are reviewing concedes this much in the following
statement: "No one who has studied the question will contend
that the prophet did nothing but foretell events. In many
instances that was no part of his work." If a study of the
question discloses the fact that there are instances when
"foretelling events"-one of the meanings of the word
"prophesy "-is no part of the work of the prophesying,
then the same study of the question, in the same way, discloses
the additional fact that there are instances in which
"publicly instructing the people"--another meaning of
the word--is no part of the work of the prophesying done on the
occasion. This being true, then it cannot be determined by the
circumstance that the dictionaries give "publicly teaching
the people" as one of the meanings of the word, that this
particular meaning applies in those particular instances where
women are represented as doing the prophesying. Indeed, according
to the author's own reasoning in the case, these may be the very
instances where this particular meaning makes up no part of the
prophesying done. Still, the writer jogs innocently along,
quoting dictionary after dictionary, commentary after commentary,
perfectly oblivious to the fact that, according to his own
presentation of the case, no point can possibly be made by
parading dictionaries, when all of them give other meanings which
have equal claims on this account to be adopted as the proper
meanings in those instances where women are represented as doing
the prophesying. Why the author should quote commentaries as
-33-
authority on the meaning of words we leave among some other
inexplicable mysteries. The only lexical authority pertinent to
the case he has studiously ignored. Both Webster and Worcester
define "prophetess," which is the only word that they
do define touching the matter in dispute; but in their
definitions of this word there is no mention or intimation of
publicity in their prophetic work. The second effort to prove
woman's right to make public speeches is based on the fact that
Miriam, Deborah, Huldah, and Anna, in Jewish and Patriarchal
times, "prophesied." We will here again mention that
"prophesying," on the part of woman is not in dispute.
We only deny that she may speak by way of prophesying in a public
way. All parties to the controversy admit that she may speak,
either by way of teaching, preaching, or prophesying. It is only
when, as a teacher, speaker, preacher, or prophet, she assumes an
attitude of authority over man, and when as such she makes
herself conspicuously prominent before the public, thus inviting
prejudicial criticism, that objections are taken. It is the
prominence and the publicity necessarily assumed in making
individual public speeches which constitutes the basis of Paul's
prohibitory injunction on woman. Now the writer of the article
under review has not given a solitary item in the history of
these prophetesses which could in any way be regarded as an
infringement of the principle above announced. But even were this
done, nothing would be gained for his cause. If he had shown that
a hundred of such prophetesses had delivered personal public
harangues in a hundred public assemblies, and all
-34-
with the stamp of divine approval upon it, still he would have
proved nothing concerning woman's privileges in the churches of
Christ. Many things were done in Judaism and in the Patriarchal
dispensation which the author knows and concedes are not allowed
in the churches of Christ. If the fact of circumcision and animal
sacrifices practiced under former dispensations fails to
authorize such practices in the reign of Christ, then all
references to prophetic practices under these dispensations to
prove Christian privileges for women or men either are
confessedly useless, and need no other answer than silence. This
also relieves us of the necessity of exposing some flat
contradictions of the inspired history which the author makes in
his statements concerning Miriam, Aaron, and Moses in this
connection. Next, the author calls attention to the facts of
Pentecost as a fulfillment of Joel's Prophecy, in the following
statement: "The women and Mary, the mother of Jesus (Acts
1:14), were present with the men in the upper room when they were
praying for the promise of the Father. 'When the day of Pentecost
was fully come, they were all with one accord in one place.'
(Acts 2: 1). The 'all' of verse 1, chapter 2, includes the women
of chapter 1, verse 14." The writer might with the same
propriety have chosen any other "all" in the Bible as
the one he selects from Acts 1:14 to correspond with the
"all" of Acts 2:1. If there is anything in grammatical
construction to determine the meaning of language, then the
"all" of Acts 2:1 is limited to the
"apostles," and consequently none save the apostles
prophesied on that memorable occasion.
-35-
In Levi Hedge's " Logic," page 161;, is the
following rule of interpretation: " Relative words should be
referred to the nearest, rather than to a remote
antecedent." By force of this rule the pronoun
"they," in the expression "they were all of one
accord in one place " (Acts 2:1), must be referred to
"apostles" in the verse immediately preceding this as
its "nearest antecedent," and not to the one hundred
and twenty, including the "women and Mary, the mother of
Jesus," which would be an antecedent twelve verses
"more remote" than this. Hence Luke, in giving the
personality of the prophetic manifestations of that occasion,
puts it: "But Peter, standing up with the eleven, lifted up
his voice," etc.; not Peter, standing up with the one
hundred and twenty, including the "women and Mary, the
mother of Jesus." And this is further confirmed by the fact
that the mocking multitude observing the phenomenon, said:
"These men are full of new wine;" not these men and
women are full of new wine. So that Mr. Kerley's appeal to the
facts of Pentecost affords him no help in making out his case in
favor of women preaching in public assemblies. On the contrary,
the facts of that occasion show most conclusively that the public
speaking of that day was done by men exclusively. For a reply to
what he says about Paul's discourse on "women praying and
prophesying," in 1 Cor. 11, we refer the reader to the first
part of this tract, where that mattel is fully considered in our
reply to W.T. Moore on this passage in the Scriptures. This
brings us up to this latest effort in the way of interpreting
scripture to suit preconceived notions and tenderly cherished
doctrines.
-36-
After quoting the passage of Scripture (1 Cor. l4: 34,35), the
author expresses his conception of its meaning as follows:
"It was the part the women were taking in the disputes
arising out of the custom of speaking in unknown tongues that
Paul disapproves, and not their 'praying and prophesying ' which
he approves in the eleventh chapter of this letter." His
idea is that the church at Corinth was in a disgraceful
"wrangle" over the use of the supernatural gift of
tongues, and that the apostle throughout the entire chapter is
condemning the manner in which this gift was exercised. He claims
that as a result of the improper use of this spiritual gift the
church at Corinth became involved in "disputes,"
"wrangles," "debates," and as Dr. A. Clarke,
whom the author quotes with unqualified approval, puts it:
"Asking questions and dictating in the assemblies,
questioning and finding fault," etc. Now the author thinks
the Corinthian women made themselves so conspicuous in these
indecorous altercations and wordy proceedings that he found it
necessary to restrain them by this divine legislation; and hence
the prohibition in the passage in question. Concerning this, the
latest special, we have the following observations to make: 1.
Dr. Kerley declares that Paul's condemnation in this passage does
not rest on the "prophesying" in this context; but, on
the other hand, it is here, as elsewhere, commended. But Dr.
Moore contends that the condemnation of the passage is directed
specially toward the "prophesying" mentioned in this
context. It certainly is a marvelous thing that these two
doctors, starting out from premises directly opposite to each
other, should nevertheless reach the same conclusion.
-37-
I have heard that two straight lines may gradually approach
each other, and never meet; but never before this instance has my
attention been called to the fact that two straight lines,
proceeding in opposite directions, may nevertheless be made to
meet. From what we have seen, however, of the character of both
these lines, we should not be in the least degree surprised at
such a meeting. 2. Our second observation is that the advocates
of women speaking in public profess in this way to compliment the
ladies. To deny them the privilege of public speaking, it is
claimed, is ungallant and a reflection on female intelligence;
and those who do so are held forth as special objects of female
scorn and resentment. Now if such reflections should grow
legitimately out of this course (precisely the opposite is true,
however), any mention of it comes with bad grace from those whose
very arguments on the subject are based exclusively on a much
severer reflection-viz., that women have such a crude conception
of the ordinary proprieties of life, or so little inclination to
observe them, that the restraints of divine legislation are
necessary to hold them within the bounds of decent and
respectable behavior in the church assemblies. It further occurs
to me in this connection that such conduct as is here claimed to
have been in the church at Corinth was highly disgraceful upon
the part of any persons engaged in it, whether male or female.
Now in case such conduct really existed in Corinth, since the
prohibition is restricted to the women, the inference would be
clear that they alone were guilty.
-38-
Had there been any man thus engaged, Paul would not have
shielded him from censure. An argument, therefore, which thus
makes out the ladies exclusively to be such disorderly characters
is the "most unkindest cut of all" by way of reflection
on the "noble sisters." I would suggest to the writer
whose arguments we are examining, that it is exceedingly unsafe
to depend on the imagination for the foundation of an argument.
It is almost sure to paint the colors so bright that the argument
itself is lost in its glare. 3. But again. Whatever speech it is
that is here condemned in the churches is transferred by the
apostle to the home circle: "And if they will learn
anything, let them ask their husbands at home; for it is a shame
for women to speak in the church." But this author claims
that this speaking was "dictating,"
"fault-finding," "doubtful disputation," and
"wrangling; " so that, according to his interpretation
women are privileged to indulge liberally in all these delightful
recreations, provided only that they are kept safely within the
home circle! 4. Our last observation on this latest "special
application" is that there is not the slightest evidence
that those things alluded to by the author were in existence in
the church at Corinth at all. "Miraculous gifts" were
there, and among them were the gifts of prophecy and tongues.
Paul gives instruction how both these gifts should be used, that
those on whom they were conferred might know how to use them.
This much is in evidence; but if there was any actual misuse of
them in Corinth, it is certainly left out of sight. In all this
chapter there is not one word of censure.
-39-
reproof, or complaint that either of these gifts had been
improperly exercised; neither is there a single intimation in
Paul's discourse on this subject from which it can be inferred
that there were dissensions growing out of any such habit. The
"dictating," "fault-finding," "doubtful
disputation," and "wrangling" mentioned by this
writer as well as the alleged improper use of spiritual gifts as
the occasion of them, never had any existence except in the
remarkably fertile imagination of the author. First, the writer
imagines an improper use of the gift of tongues in the Corinthian
church; then he imagines a disgraceful controversy growing out of
this imaginary abuse of the gift of tongues; then he imagines the
women were participating in this imaginary discussion. occasioned
by this imaginary cause; and, finally, he imagines the apostolic
prohibition specially applies to this imaginary woman part in
this imaginary contention, based on this imaginary misuse of the
gift of tongues. Now, in view of the facts in the case, we feel
justified in saying that this last wine of the feast is the
weakest and worst of the lot. Instead of being, as it ought to
be, a solid array of scripture and reason, it turns out to be the
insubstantial vagaries of a highly inflamed and distorted
imagination, ranging wildly and recklessly about, vainly
endeavoring to find some ground on which to make a plea in direct
opposition to good sense, sound reason, and the plain teaching of
the word of God. This woman-preacher movement is one, and the
worst, of the many forms in which the "new woman" craze
finds expression.
-40-
Its tendency is to break down the divine order of things, for
which order alone woman is naturally fitted and scripturally
instructed, and in the prevalence of which alone the benevolent
purposes of God in her behalf can be reached. It has for some
years been developing in the field of politics and social life,
and its results here give unmistakable token of what its general
adoption would bring about. When it reaches floodtide (which God
forbid!), and woman plucks this much-coveted yet forbidden fruit,
then too late will she in bitterness begin that dead march away
from her domestic Eden. With woman's accession to what is falsely
called "equal civil, political, and religious rights,"
there will follow a departure of woman's influence from society
at large; and thus the machinery of human life, having lost its
balance wheel will degenerate into a state of social, political,
and religious wreck and ruin. To avert such appalling disasters
was doubtless the purpose of God in casting about woman the
sanctions of divine legislation. Instructed in and controlled by
such directions as Paul gives the women in Corinth, and through
them to all womankind, it will not be difficult for woman to see
the sphere in human life which she should fill.
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